顶刊前沿 |《美国政治科学杂志》2020年第2期( American Journal of Political Science)
让每一个人自由地理解政治
让世界各地的学人成果互联互通
让政治学人的核心关切得到传播
让闪烁的政治学人共享这片充满思考和情怀的天空
政治学人始终在路上
本期国际化部为大家带来了《美国政治科学杂志》2020年第2期文章编译。
编译属国际化部译者志愿提供,如有不妥欢迎指正;如对我们的工作有什么建议,欢迎到后台留言;如有转载请注明出处。学术公益是一条很长的路,我们诚邀您同行,欢迎留言您希望编译的政治学期刊,感谢您的支持。
PART 1
期刊简介
American Journal of Political Science(美国政治科学杂志)是美国中西部政治学协会(MPSA)旗下学术期刊,目前由威立出版社代为出版。创刊于1973年,出版周期为每年4期,收录与政治科学相关的所有子领域。IF:4.515,在176种政治科学期刊中排名第2.
期刊研究领域和收录范围包括:政治理论研究、政治学方法论、比较政治学、国际关系等。
PART 2
期刊目录
Unprincipled Principals: Co-opted Bureaucrats and Corruption in Ghana
无操守的首长——加纳的官僚增选和腐败
When Do Displaced Persons Return? Postwar Migration among Christians in Mount Lebanon
流离失所的人们何时归来?——黎巴嫩山基督徒的战后迁徙
Online Tallies and the Context of Politics: How Online Tallies Make Dominant Candidates Appear Competent in Contexts of Conflict
线上量表和政治环境——线上量表如何在冲突背景下凸显占主导地位的候选人
Land Reform and Civil Conflict: Theory and Evidence from Peru
土地改革和内部矛盾——相关理论及来自秘鲁的证据支持
Beyond the Unit Root Question: Uncertainty and Inference
超越单位根问题——不确定性与推论
For Safety or Profit? How Science Serves the Strategic Interests of Private Actors
安全与利润的选择困难——论科学应当如何服务于私人行为体的战略利益
Flexibility or Stability? Analyzing Proposals to Reform the Separation of Powers
经权之“辨”——解析有关分权改革的提案
Coalition Government, Legislative Institutions, and Public Policy in Parliamentary Democracies
议会民主制中的联合政府、立法机构和公共政策
The Mobilizing Effect of Parties’ Moral Rhetoric
试论政党道德说辞的动员效果
Crashing the Party? Elites, Outsiders, and Elections
让政党垮台?精英、局外人和选举
Ideological Competition and Conflict in the Judicial Hierarchy
司法等级制中的意识形态交锋与冲突
Democracy’s Pin Factory: Issue Specialization, the Division of Cognitive Labor, and Epistemic Performance
民主识别工厂:议题专业化、认知分工及认知表现
Strategic Candidate Entry and Congressional Elections in the Era of Fox News
福克斯新闻时代下的战略候选人入选和国会选举
When Do Leaders Free-Ride? Business Experience and Contributions to Collective Defense
领袖何时会“搭便车”?从商经历与对集体防卫的贡献
PART 3
精选译文
01 无操守的首长——加纳的官僚增选和腐败
【题目】
Unprincipled Principals: Co-opted Bureaucrats and Corruption in Ghana
【作者】
Sarah Brierley London School of Economics and Political Science
【摘要】
根据现有的理论,通常认为授予政客监督官僚的工具可以减少行政渎职。而笔者却认为,当这些政客有为参选筹措资金的需求或是缺少制度约束时,这种针对官僚的政治控制反而会增加腐败行为。在这样的情形下,政客可以利用其自由裁量权(Discretionary Power)激励官僚替他们私吞公款、中饱私囊。基于一项通过随机抽样(Random Sample)获得的加纳80个地方政府的原始调查数据(N=864),笔者发现当官僚认为政客被赋予更多的自由裁量权时,官僚们就更有可能“围猎”他们。使用定性数据和列项实验法(List Experiment)对该机制进行验证后,笔者发现政客通过威胁调任不服从者的方式实现了腐败。笔者的研究为发展中国家公共行政缺陷的根源提供了新的证据,同时也修正了认为更强的政治监督能改善治理的假设。
In theory, granting politicians tools to oversee bureaucrats can reduce administrative malfeasance. In contrast, I argue that the political control of bureaucrats can increase corruption when politicians need money to fund election campaigns and face limited institutional constraints. In such contexts, politicians can leverage their discretionary powers to incentivize bureaucrats to extract rents from the state on politicians’ behalf. Using data from an original survey of bureaucrats (N = 864) across 80 randomly sampled local governments in Ghana, I show that bureaucrats are more likely to facilitate politicians’ corrupt behavior when politicians are perceived to be empowered with higher levels of discretionary control. Using qualitative data and a list experiment to demonstrate the mechanism, I show that politicians enact corruption by threatening to transfer noncompliant officers. My findings provide new evidence on the sources of public administrative deficiencies in developing countries and qualify the presumption that greater political oversight improves governance.
02 流离失所的人们何时归来?——黎巴嫩山基督徒的战后迁移
【题目】
When Do Displaced Persons Return? Postwar Migration among Christians in Mount Lebanon
【作者】
Kara Ross Camarena University of Chicago
Nils Hägerdal Tufts University
【摘要】
在怎样的情况下,流离失所者会在战后重返曾经的家园?根据劳动力迁移的理论,我们认为除非故土有着诱人的发展机会,不然即使是那些对曾经的家园有着美好回忆的流离失所者可能也仅仅会定期回访,但不会再回到故土定居。而且,我们认为暴行不仅会给那片曾经流过血的土地蒙上阴影,同时也会让流离失所者厌恶那些作过孽的人[1]。在种族战争后,曾经流离失所的人们不愿意返回到那些有很多非本族人居住的地方,这一点也会加剧种族隔离。我们研究了1980年代黎巴嫩山流离失所的基督徒们的战后迁徙,并用橄榄油(当地主要出口产品)的外部价格冲击来界定经济状况。对于经济重建和转型正义(Transitional Justice)的相关政策,我们的研究所能给予的最主要启示是,有时候我们应该考虑的是如何帮助那些流离失所者在新的地方安居乐业,而不是促使他们再回到曾经的故乡重新定居。
[1] 此处更完整的解释是,流离失所的人不会把作恶者单个拎出来怪罪,而是把那些非本族的人们当作一个整体来怪罪,从而不愿意住在有很多非本族人居住的地方。
Under what conditions will forcibly displaced persons return to their original homes after wars end? We draw on theories of labor migration to show that even displaced persons who have positive feelings toward their original location may nevertheless choose to return as regular visitors rather than permanent residents unless the location offers attractive economic opportunities. Furthermore, we argue that violence can create negative emotions not only toward geographic locations of bloodshed but also against its perpetrators. After ethnic wars, the displaced may be unwilling to return to intermixed locations, exacerbating ethnic separation. We study postwar migration among Lebanese Christians displaced during the 1980s and identify economic conditions using exogenous price shocks for olive oil, a major local export. Among policy implications for economic reconstruction and transitional justice, our most important insight is that sometimes we should help the displaced in their new location rather than induce permanent return to their old homes.
03 线上量表和政治环境——线上量表如何在冲突背景下凸显占主导地位的候选人
【题目】
Online Tallies and the Context of Politics: How Online Tallies Make Dominant Candidates Appear Competent in Contexts of Conflict
【作者】
Lasse Laustsen Aarhus University
Michael Bang Petersen Aarhus University
【摘要】
本文中,我们延伸了关于线上量表的经典看法,用于阐明拥有主导地位的政治领导人迅速崛起的心理学基础。我们以两项基于人口的分组调查(Panel Survey)及嵌入式实验(Embedded Experiment),证明了公民(1)在他们的长期记忆中保留了关于候选者人格的长期印象,并且(2)会根据当下具体的情形检索不同的线上量表。我们假设并证明了尤其是在冲突加剧的政治环境中,针对候选人的评价与其支配地位的线上印象之间的相关关系会迅速地从负相关转向正相关。尽管线上量表的相关理念最初只是作为选民为何会基于对有关政策看法的一致性从而给候选人投票这一行为的解释,但是我们还发现了一个现象——即使候选人并没什么吸引力或者是不在重要议题上与其选民分享政策观点,线上量表对于政治环境的敏感度有利于占主导地位的候选人。
In this article, we extend the classical notion of online tallies to shed light on the psychology underlying the rapid emergence of dominant political leaders. Predicated on two population-based panel surveys with embedded experiments, we demonstrate that citizens (1) store extremely durable tallies of candidate personalities in their long-term memory and (2) retrieve different tallies depending on the context. In particular, we predict and demonstrate that when contexts become more conflict-ridden, candidate evaluations rapidly shift from being negatively to positively associated with online impressions of candidate dominance. Although the notion of online tallies was originally proposed as an explanation of why citizens are able to vote for candidates on the basis of policy agreement, we demonstrate how the existence of context-sensitive online tallies can favor dominant candidates, even if the candidate is otherwise unappealing or does not share policy views with citizens on key issues.
04 土地改革和内部矛盾——相关理论及来自秘鲁的证据支持
【题目】
Land Reform and Civil Conflict: Theory and Evidence from Peru
【作者】
Michael Albertus University of Chicago
【摘要】
土地改革是如何影响国内冲突的?本文通过1969至1980年秘鲁军事统治时期所有涉及土地征用的原始数据,以及来自秘鲁真相及调解委员会(The Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission)在1980至2000内乱时期有关农村谋杀的事件级数据研究了这一问题。
笔者使用了地理断点回归设计(Geographic Regression Discontinuity Design),该设计利用了秘鲁通过局部地对于那些和原先主要行政区划映射不完整的区域进行土地改革的方法。笔者发现,规模更大的土地改革能够缓解随后的冲突。与邻近且土改力度较小的地区相比,处于核心地段且土改力度较大的区域爆发的冲突更少。进一步的检验表明,土地改革是通过(1)促进反叛乱(的情绪);(2)增加收集情报的难度;(3)增强日后用于抵抗暴力的地方组织;(4)削弱左翼的马克思主义者和(5)增加武装团体的机会成本,从而来减缓冲突的。[1]
[1] 即在高强度的改革地区,由于缺乏非受益人,社区内部和社区之间没有普遍的不满情绪,从而削弱了游击队的平民支持。因此,由国家转变为土地所有者的农民也有强烈的动机来支持国家反对叛乱分子,促进平民与国家在反叛乱中的后勤和情报合作。最后,高强度的土地改革可以凝聚农民社群,增强集体行动的能力,甚至在日后可以用来击退武装分子。
How does land reform impact civil conflict? This article examines this question in the prominent case of Peru by leveraging original data on all land expropriations under military rule from 1969 to 1980 and event-level data from the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission on rural killings during Peru’s internal conflict from 1980 to 2000.
Using a geographic regression discontinuity design that takes advantage of Peru’s regional approach to land reform through zones that did not entirely map onto major preexisting administrative boundaries, I find that greater land reform dampened subsequent conflict. Districts in core areas of land reform zones that received intense land reform witnessed less conflict relative to comparable districts in adjacent peripheral areas where less land reform occurred. Further tests suggest that land reform mitigated conflict by facilitating counterinsurgency and intelligence gathering, building local organizational capacity later used to deter violence, undercutting the Marxist left, and increasing opportunity costs to supporting armed groups.
05 超越单位根问题——不确定性与推论
【题目】
Beyond the Unit Root Question: Uncertainty and Inference
【作者】
Clayton Webb University of Kansas
Suzanna Linn Penn State University
Matthew J. Lebo University of Western Ontario
【摘要】
应用时序分析师(Applied Time-Series Analysts)面临的一个基本挑战是,当我们并不确定数据是否包含单位根(Unit Root)的时候,要如何得出有关长期关系(Long-Run Relationship, LRR)的推论。众所周知,由于单位根检验并不可靠,经常会给分析师带来(应用类别上的)不确定性,然而现存的主流方法却又需要正确的分类(从而选取正确的模型和假设检验框架)。Webb、Linn 与Lebo (WLL; 2019) 开发了一个基于临界值(Critical Value)边界的推论框架,用于长期乘数(Long-Run Multiplier, LRM)的假设检验。该检验避开了单位根的检验,并纳入了确定用于得出长期关系推论的数据的动态特性(Dynamic Properties of the Data)时固有的不确定性。我们展示了WLL bounds procedure(即前文提到过的那个推论框架)是如何应用于任何一个完全指定的回归模型,以解决这个基本挑战的。同时我们通过提出了一组将应用于工作的临界边界集,延伸了WLL的结果,同时也展示了两次应用中长期乘数边界步骤(LRM bounds procedure)的实证相关性。
A fundamental challenge facing applied time-series analysts is how to draw inferences about long-run relationships (LRR) when we are uncertain whether the data contain unit roots. Unit root tests are notoriously unreliable and often leave analysts uncertain, but popular extant methods hinge on correct classification. Webb, Linn, and Lebo (WLL; 2019) develop a framework for inference based on critical value bounds for hypothesis tests on the long-run multiplier (LRM) that eschews unit root tests and incorporates the uncertainty inherent in identifying the dynamic properties of the data into inferences about LRRs. We show how the WLL bounds procedure can be applied to any fully specified regression model to solve this fundamental challenge, extend the results of WLL by presenting a general set of critical value bounds to be used in applied work, and demonstrate the empirical relevance of the LRM bounds procedure in two applications.
06 安全与利润的两难选择——论科学应当如何服务于私人行为体的战略利益
【题目】
For Safety or Profit? How Science Serves the Strategic Interests of Private Actors
【作者】
Rebecca L. Perlman Princeton University
【摘要】
科学是风险监管的关键,但是谁提供了风险监管所依据的科学呢?通过对国内健康和安全标准深入实证分析,本文阐明了私人行为体是如何利用科学的信息来获益的。笔者建立了一个能够描述公司在何种状况下会对其产品运用更严标准的模型,同时也揭示了公司是如何通过有策略地提供相关信息从而获益的。为了检验这个理论,笔者追踪了美国农用化学品标准在两个十年期之间发生的变化。另外,笔者还引入了公司级的申请数据和历史证据来直接检验该机制。这一研究成果为公司如何从法规中受益的策略提供了新的见解,同时也促使我们重新思考何为基于科学的(风险)监管。
Science is central to the regulation of risk. But who provides the science on which risk regulations are based? Through an in-depth empirical analysis of domestic health and safety standards, this article shows how private actors use scientific information to acquire preferential outcomes. I develop a formal model delineating conditions under which firms will seek stricter standards on their own products, and I reveal how companies can acquire these outcomes through the strategic provision of information. To test the theory, I track changes to U.S. agrochemical standards over a two-decade period. I also introduce firm-level petition data and historical evidence to test the mechanism directly. My findings provide new insight into the strategies companies use to benefit from regulations, while also forcing us to reevaluate what it means for regulations to be based on science.
07 经权之“辨”——解析有关分权改革的提案
【题目】
Flexibility or Stability? Analyzing Proposals to Reform the Separation of Powers
【作者】
Gleason Judd Princeton University
Lawrence S. Rothenberg University of Rochester
【摘要】
人们常常对总统制下美国国会等立法机构对于社会福利的影响感到失望。
作为回应,一些有关改革分权体系(The Separation of Powers System)的提案涌现了出来。这些提案旨在赋予总统对立法议程的控制权,同时削弱阻挠议事(Filibuster)等规则。我们提供了一项博弈分析(Game-Theoretic Analysis),该分析指向更强调行政中心性的制度对政策和社会福利的影响。通过将有关立法和行政激励的标准假设整合到私人投资决策的动态模型中,笔者发现在各种条件下更强的行政权并不能带来更好的结果。此外,笔者也描述了诸如决策环境稳定性、投资基础等因素是如何影响这些条件的。本文的发现是经得起推敲的,同时也与实证观察得到的经验相符——即美国的政策执行并不一定比那些具有更强大行政权的国家差,而所谓更强大的行政权的提案几乎主要是由民粹主义改革者提出的。
The social welfare effects of legislatures in presidential systems, such as the U.S. Congress, are frequently lamented.
In response, there are proposals to reform the separation of powers system by giving presidents control of the legislative agenda and weakening rules such as the filibuster. We provide a game-theoretic analysis of the policy and social welfare consequences of a more executive-centric system. Integrating standard assumptions about legislative and executive incentives into a dynamic model of decision making with private investment, we show there are a variety of conditions under which stronger executives do not produce better outcomes. Moreover, we characterize how these conditions depend on factors such as the stability of the policymaking environment or investment fundamentals. Our findings are robust and consistent with empirical observations that U.S. policy outputs are not necessarily worse than those of nations with stronger executives, which more closely approximate prominent proposals by populist-oriented reformers.
08 议会民主制中的联合政府、立法机构和公共政策
【题目】
Coalition Government, Legislative Institutions, and Public Policy in Parliamentary Democracies
【作者】
Lanny W. Martin Bocconi University
Georg Vanberg Duke University
【摘要】
大多数民主制国家由多个立场相互冲突的政党组成的联合政府所治理。
这种政府形式的普遍性提出了一个重要的问题——政党在选举过程中作出过的哪些承诺会最终体现在政府的政策中呢?近来的理论认为多党联合政府中各党相对影响的大小主要取决于制度背景,这挑战了我们对于多党联合政府的理解。当制度存在允许各党之间进行商讨的空间的时候,最终的政策比较能够反映出各党之间所作的妥协。但是如果没有这样的制度,最终政策则主要反映了控制了小党们的大党的偏好。然而并没有实证经验能够直接证明这种条件关系。笔者通过分析15个议会民主制国家社保政策的变化,提供了首个系统性的证据,表明立法机构的能力与联合政府中各党对最终政策的相对影响力显著相关。该研究对我们关于联合政府、政策制定和选举(与政策的)响应度的理解,有着重要启示。
Most democracies are governed by coalitions, comprising multiple political parties with conflicting policy positions.
The prevalence of these governments poses a significant question: Which parties’ electoral commitments are ultimately reflected in government policy? Recent theories have challenged our understanding of multiparty government, arguing that the relative influence of coalition parties depends crucially on institutional context. Specifically, where institutions allow credible enforcement of bargains, policy should reflect a compromise among all governing parties; where such institutions are absent, the preferences of parties controlling the relevant ministries should prevail. Critically, empirical work has thus far failed to provide direct evidence for this conditional relationship. Analyzing changes in social protection policies in 15 parliamentary democracies, we provide the first systematic evidence that the strength of legislative institutions significantly shapes the relative policy influence of coalition parties. Our findings have implications for our understanding of coalition government, policymaking, and electoral responsiveness.
09 试论政党道德说辞的动员效果
【题目】
The Mobilizing Effect of Parties’ Moral Rhetoric
【作者】
Jae-Hee Jung University of Oxford
【摘要】
政党是如何使用道德说辞来影响选民行为的?先前的比较政党研究已经就政党立场问题进行了不少研究,但却没有对政党是如何解释和证成其立场的有足够的关注。笔者从政治心理学和道德心理学出发,认为道德说辞能够通过激发本党“铁粉”对于其政党偏好的积极情绪实现动员。笔者预期,这一假设同样适用于那些受到党派观点狂轰滥炸的“铁粉”们。为了检验该论点,笔者通过对六个说英语的民主制国家的政党宣言进行文本分析,测量了其中的道德说辞。同时笔者也使用了相关调查中有关“铁粉”们出席率的数据来衡量动员能力。研究的结果支持了笔者的观点。此外,笔者还通过来自英国的调查实验(Survey Experiment)和分组调查(Panel Survey)的数据发现了能够支持该理论机制的证据。本文证明了道德说辞作为政党竞选框架(的一部分),对于选民行为有着重要的影响。
How does parties’ use of moral rhetoric affect voter behavior? Prior comparative party research has studied party positions without much attention to how parties explain and justify their positions. Drawing insights from political and moral psychology, I argue that moral rhetoric mobilizes copartisan voters by activating positive emotions about their partisan preference. I expect this to hold among copartisans who are exposed to party rhetoric. To test my argument, I measure moral rhetoric by text-analyzing party manifestos from six English-speaking democracies and measure mobilization using copartisan turnout in survey data. The results support my argument. Furthermore, I find evidence in support of the theoretical mechanism using survey experiments and panel survey data from Britain. The article shows that moral rhetoric is a party campaign frame that has important consequences for voter behavior.
10 让政党垮台?精英、局外人和选举
【题目】
Crashing the Party? Elites, Outsiders, and Elections
【作者】
Peter Buisseret University of Chicago
Richard Van Weelden University of Pittsburgh
【摘要】
我们研究了两党之间提名候选人的一次选举。虽然两党在传统意义上是两极分化的,但其实两党内部在全球化这个议题上也有着意见分歧。[1]笔者将那些有声望、有资源、能够“弯道超车”(bypass)本党精英的党外候选人的进入作为(一种)威胁引入(研究)。我们(1)考虑了选民何时会转向支持党外人士;(2)确认了党外人士通过既定的政党提名程序(而非通过第三方政党来绕过该党)进入选举的条件。我们还进一步地探究了在何种情况下本党精英无法应对党外人士的威胁。本文的理论框架强调了在两党意识形态两极分化特别严重的时期,既有的政党是如何变得特别容易让党外人士进入的,尤其是对于多数党而言。
[1] 文章中对“Second Issue Dimension”更具体的解释是“Globalism”和“Anti-Globalism”。
We consider an election between two parties that nominate candidates for office. The parties are polarized along a traditional cleavage, but they are also internally divided along a second issue dimension. We introduce a threat of entry from Outsider candidates, who have the prominence and resources to bypass party elites. We consider when voters will turn to Outsiders, and identify the conditions under which Outsiders will enter the election through an established party’s nomination process, as opposed to circumventing established parties via a third-party challenge. We further explore when the elites will fail to respond to the threat of Outsider candidates. Our framework highlights how established parties will be especially vulnerable to Outsider primary entry in periods of intense ideological polarization between the parties, and that this vulnerability is especially heightened for the majority party.
11 司法等级制中的意识形态交锋与冲突
【题目】
Ideological Competition and Conflict in the Judicial Hierarchy
【作者】
Joshua A. Strayhorn University of Colorado at Boulder
【摘要】
巡回法庭[1]之间的意见分歧,或是在美国多个法庭之间上诉时相冲突的条规,对于最高法院的案例选择有着重要的政策意义和深远影响。然而对于下级法院在决定是否引发(与上级法院)冲突时思想上的刺激因素,我们却所知甚少。本文建立了一个司法等级体系的模型。在该模型中,下级法院的法官会因上级法院对于未解决的冲突的不满而受其审查(即所谓的“意见分歧零容忍”),也会因不明确的政策偏好而受到审查。下级法院可能会通过在法律质量上投入很多精力来使他们的条规更具吸引力的方式(与上级法院)进行抗争。
根据等式,即使成功的概率很渺茫,下级法院也可能对上级法院发起冲突。令人惊讶的是,随着上级法院的不容忍度的增加,下级法院发起冲突的可能性是随之增加的。然而,对于意见分歧的不容忍也可能会刺激下级法院作出更大的努力。笔者提供了定性的证据来说明该模型的解释力。
[1] 巡回法官,在不同司法辖区中的巡回法院内的法官。或任何在美国联邦上诉法院,又称巡回上诉法院(circuit courts)任职的法官。
Circuit splits, or conflicting rules across multiple U.S. Courts of Appeals, have important policy implications and dramatic effects on Supreme Court case selection, yet we know little about the incentives ideological lower courts face when deciding whether to initiate conflict. This article develops a formal model of a judicial hierarchy where lower court judges are subject to review by a high court with distaste for unresolved conflict, termed “split-intolerance,” and with uncertain preferences over policy. Lower courts may compete by investing costly effort in legal quality to make their rules more attractive.
In equilibrium, lower courts may initiate conflict even when the odds of success before the high court are remote. Surprisingly, lower courts grow more likely to create conflict as the high court’s split-intolerance increases; however, split-intolerance can also incentivize greater lower court effort. I present qualitative evidence illustrating the model’s explanatory power.
12 民主识别工厂:议题专业化、认知分工及认知表现
【题目】
Democracy’s Pin Factory: Issue Specialization, the Division of Cognitive Labor, and Epistemic Performance
【作者】
Kevin J. Elliott Murray State University
【摘要】
本文描述了如何通过被称作是“公众议题”的议事机构来使议题专业化(Issue Specialization),从而提高民主决策的质量。议题的专业化是通过实例化(Instantiating)大众之间的认知分工(Division of Labor)来改善决策的。议题专业化的做法既能够提高决策效率,又能够给予广大的普通民众甚至超越那一小撮最聪明能干的人肉眼可见的优势。此外,议题专业化还能通过捕捉议题的特定信息、把议题框定在一个特定的范围里,以及改进公民的议题偏好,来进一步提高决策质量。这些优点体现在广泛的民主政治、消息灵通的政策,以及具有明确选举动机的民众代表。本文回应了对政治无知(Political Ignorance)、两极化/党派关系、寻租和社会经济偏见的关切,并认为议题专业化可以为两极分化提供宝贵的解决措施,但这需要完善制度以吸引边缘化的公民并消除偏见。
This article describes how issue specialization through deliberative institutions called “issue publics” can improve the quality of democratic decision making. Issue specialization improves decisions by instantiating a cognitive division of labor among the mass public, which creates efficiencies in decision making and grants large groups of average citizens a scalable advantage over small groups of even the smartest and most capable individuals. Issue specialization further improves decisions by capturing issue-specific information, concentrating it within the specialized deliberative enclaves of issue publics, and refining citizens’ issue preferences. These advantages are brought to bear in wider democratic politics and policy through information shortcuts and through the specialized electoral incentives of representatives. The article responds to concerns about political ignorance, polarization/partisanship, rent seeking, and socioeconomic bias and argues that issue specialization can provide a valuable brake to polarization yet needs institutional supplementation to engage marginalized citizens and combat bias.
13 福克斯新闻时代下战略性候选人的当选与国会选举
【题目】
Strategic Candidate Entry and Congressional Elections in the Era of Fox News
【作者】
Kevin Arceneaux Temple University
Johanna Dunaway Texas A&M University
Martin Johnson Louisiana State University
Ryan J. Vander Wielen Temple University
【摘要】
选举的初衷是给予选民问责民选官员行为的能力。为此,候选人必须为选民提供可靠可选的方案。在美国,与其他弱政党体系一样,挑战执政党代表的重任落在了那些独立的、有策略的、懂得谨慎选择可用信息的政治家身上。笔者们研究了党派媒体作为信息来源在竞选时发挥的作用。笔者们假设保守的福克斯新闻台(Fox News Channel)在1996年成立后的十年中,其偶然的扩张通过影响高质量潜在候选人决策估计的方式影响了国会的选举。通过福克斯新闻在当地可用的区议会的数据,笔者发现福克斯新闻改变了共和党潜在候选人对于民主党执政者脆弱性的看法,从而改变了他们进入议会的方式。
Elections are designed to give voters the ability to hold elected officials accountable for their actions. For this to work, voters must be presented with credible alternatives from which to choose. In the United States, as in other weak-party systems, the decision to challenge an incumbent representative rests with individual, strategic-minded politicians who carefully weigh the available information. We investigate the role that one source of information—partisan media—plays in shaping electoral competition. We hypothesize that the haphazard expansion of the conservative Fox News Channel in the decade after its 1996 launch influenced congressional elections by affecting the decision calculus of high-quality potential candidates. Using congressional district-level data on the local availability of Fox News, we find that Fox News altered Republican potential candidates’ perceptions about the vulnerability of Democratic incumbents, thereby changing their entry patterns.
14 领袖何时会“搭便车”?从商经历与对集体防卫的贡献
【题目】
When Do Leaders Free-Ride? Business Experience and Contributions to Collective Defense
【作者】
Matthew Fuhrmann Texas A&M University
【摘要】
搭便车(Free-Riding)的逻辑预计个人会对公共产品投资不足, 但是人们的行为常常与这个预设不一致。为什么我们会观察到搭便车行为的变化呢?本研究通过测量重要的国际公共产品——军事联盟中对于集体防御的贡献解决了这个问题。本文发展了一种搭便车的行为理论,其中世界领导人的信仰对于其向公共物品投资(行为)的解释很重要。该论点认为,具有从商经历的领导人对集体防御的贡献较小,因为他们具有利己主义倾向,更愿意依靠强大的盟友进行防卫。笔者在对1952年至2014年间17个非美国的北大西洋公约组织(The North Atlantic Treaty Organization)成员国的国防支出进行分析后发现,分析结果符合本文提出的理论。研究结果表明,具有从商经历的领导人会比其他领导人更有可能作出追求自我效用最大化的利己主义行为。
The logic of free-riding expects that individuals will underinvest in public goods, but people often behave in ways that are inconsistent with this prediction. Why do we observe variation in free-riding behavior? This study addresses this question by examining contributions to an important international public good—collective defense in military alliances. It develops a behavioral theory of free-riding in which the beliefs of world leaders are important for explaining investments in public goods. The argument holds that leaders with business experience make smaller contributions to collective defense because they are egoistic and more comfortable relying on a powerful ally for their defense. An analysis of defense expenditures in 17 non-U.S. members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization from 1952 to 2014 provides evidence consistent with the theory. The findings suggest that leaders with business experience are more likely than other heads of government to act as self-interested utility maximizers.
编 译:陈佳林
审 校:俞驰韬
相关阅读:
顶刊前沿 | American Journal of Political Science(美国政治科学杂志)2020.01
编辑:周佳银
一审:陈佳林
二审:袁 丁
点击“阅读原文”,输入“i41m”,可免费获取本期英文原文哦~